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Executive summary 
Motivation 
The Russian boom of 1999-2002, based on utilization of spare capacities and human resources, is 
running out of steam. Further economic growth requires new physical and human capital. 
Investment in new capital can be financed both from companies’ own funds and outside sources. 
Internal finance is only available to companies in natural resource industries, hence diversification of 
the economy and development of other sectors requires outside investment. Outside investment is, 
in turn, impossible without improving the quality of corporate governance.  
The Code of Corporate Conduct (hereinafter referred to as the Code) proposed by the Federal 
Commission for Securities Markets, seeks to address the problem of improving corporate 
governance and protecting outside investors. The Code prescribes standards of corporate 
governance allowing protection of investor interests at the level of capital markets in OECD 
countries. Adoption of the Code or its specific rules and standards is supposed to be voluntary. 
Russian experience has shown that in the absence of a mature judiciary system, voluntary adoption 
of new institutions may be the only available solution. Indeed, if corporate legislation is not 
enforced, it does not matter how perfect it is. At the same time, self-regulation along with 
reputation-based mechanisms can, in full or in part, compensate for a low level of enforcement.   
The success of the Code will thus depend on incentives for companies to adopt its rules and 
standards. The main goal of this paper is to study what determines these incentives. 
The study 
Using a survey of a representative sample of about 1,000 Russian industrial enterprises and official 
data on their financial accounts, we try to establish relationships between the ownership structure, 
the level of corporate governance, demand for modern standards of corporate governance, and 
investment, controlling for the size, financial position, sectoral and regional characteristics of 
companies. The corporate governance is proxied by six objective measures of transparency and 
protection of outside investors as reported by the management. 
Main findings 
1. The ownership of Russian industrial firms is highly concentrated. 
Management controls on average 19% of shares. In firms where the management’s stakes are 
not trivial, they are 27% on average. The single largest outside owner controls on average 24% 
(40% across firms where large outside blockholders are present). At the same time, the share of 
small shareholders (defined as those who hold less 5% stock) is still high – on average they 
control 24% of shares. Since the majority of firms in our sample are non-traded firms, the 
importance of small shareholders should be a legacy of mass privatization. 
2. Level of corporate governance varies significantly among firms. 
On average, firms answered positively to 2.6 out of six questions on various indicators of 
corporate governance. Just 16% of firms gave negative answers to all six questions, 7% of firms 
gave positive answers to 5 or 6 questions. Level of corporate governance is higher in large firms, 
somewhat lower in forestry, food industry and construction materials industry, and in firms 
having high cash flows.  
3. Ownership concentration has a positive effect on corporate governance.  
The higher is concentration of ownership in hands of administration or outside blockholder, the 
higher is the level of corporate governance. However, the effect of concentration is positive 
only as long as the largest blockholder’s stake does not exceed 50%. Further concentration of 
ownership does not improve or even worsens corporate governance.  
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4. Most firms finance investments out of internal funds.  
Out of 78% firms, which invested last year, only 21% used bank credits, and just 0.7% issued 
equity to finance investment.  
5. Ownership concentration has a positive effect on investment.  
Concentration of ownership has a positive significant effect on investment. The data does not 
support the hypothesis that concentration influences investment through improved corporate 
governance. The effect of concentration on investment remains positive and significant even 
when we control for corporate governance.  
6. Corporate governance has no effect on investment.  
The level of corporate governance does not affect investments. However, the effect is positive if 
the share of minority shareholders is sufficiently high, and it is negative if ownership is 
sufficiently concentrated. 
7. Awareness of the Code of Corporate Conduct is very low. 
Only a third of respondents answered that they were familiar with the Code and only 4% said 
that they knew its contents in detail.  
8. Readiness to adopt the Code is determined by awareness about its contents, and by the current 
level of corporate governance in the firm and in other firms of the industry.  
Managers consider most of the Code’s clauses being acceptable rather than unacceptable.  
The managers have relatively more problems with norms concerning independent directors and 
information disclosure. Acceptance of the Code is higher, the higher is awareness about the 
Code and current level of corporate governance in the firm and, even to a greater extent, the 
higher is the level of corporate governance in other firms of the industry.  
 
Conclusions 
In the absence of formal mechanisms of corporate governance, concentration of ownership plays 
the key role in the investor rights protection. Our paper shows that concentration of shares in the 
hands of management or a major outside shareholder (up to certain level) has a positive impact on 
corporate governance.  
On the other hand, once management or a major outside shareholder consolidate too large a block 
of shares, further increase of their stake may even lower the level of corporate governance. This 
means that applicability of voluntary mechanisms of corporate governance is (at least so far) limited: 
voluntary mechanisms protect the rights of small outside shareholders only when managers or a 
large shareholder do not have a (qualified) majority of votes. Hence, mechanisms are needed, which 
would make it possible to reduce transaction costs of “closing” public companies (converting public 
companies into closely held ones), i.e. buying out minority shareholders if a large shareholder 
controls, for example, a qualified majority of shares.  
The Code of Corporate Conduct plays an important educational role. Still, it is largely unknown to 
Russian companies. The efforts to promote the Code and disseminate information about the best 
practice in corporate governance should be continued.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation  
The Russian boom of 1999-2002, based on utilization of spare capacities and human resources, is 
running out of steam. Further economic growth requires new physical and human capital. 
Investment can be financed both from companies’ own funds and outside sources. Internal finance 
is only available to companies in natural resource industries, hence diversification of the economy 
and development of other sectors requires outside investment. Outside investment is, in turn, 
impossible without improving the quality of corporate governance.  
Introduction of the Code of Corporate Conduct (hereinafter referred to as the Code) proposed by 
the Federal Commission for Securities Markets seeks to address the problem of improving corporate 
governance and protecting outside investors. We provide a brief description of the Code in 
Appendix. The Code prescribes standards of corporate governance allowing protection of investor 
interests on the level generally consistent with standards of Western capital markets.5 Adoption of 
the Code or its specific standards is supposed to be voluntary. Russian experience has shown that in 
the absence of a developed judiciary system, voluntary introduction of new institutions may be the 
only available solution. Indeed, if corporate legislation is not enforced, it does not matter how 
perfect it is. At the same time, self-regulation along with reputation mechanisms can, in full or in 
part, compensate for a low level of enforcement.6   
The success of the Code will thus depend on incentives for companies to adopt its rules and 
standards. The main goal of this paper is to study what determines these incentives. 
Demand for standards of corporate governance depends primarily on what powers company 
managers have, what objectives they pursue, and to what extent these objectives conflict with the 
interests of large and small outside investors. In the course of privatization, managers of many 
companies received large stakes and are now often holding controlling interests either themselves or 
through affiliates. Managers, who do not hold stakes in a company, also exercise significant actual 
control over its operations. Introduction of the corporate governance standards, such as full 
disclosure of information, compliance with the procedures of general shareholders meetings, 
appointment of independent directors, and external audit, will limit the management’s powers 
substantially. One of the principal goals of our study is to find out whether managers are prepared to 
partly cede control (and, as a consequence, to lose private benefits of control) in return for 
investment. 
In addition, introduction of the Code involves considerable technical costs. Companies for which 
these costs are significant will be less interested or willing to adopt the Code. 
The relevance of this study goes beyond understanding corporate governance in Russia.  Our study 
is intended to contribute to the research agenda of the new institutional economics: what drives the 
demand for new institutions? In what situations are economic agents prepared to adopt 
commitment devices which will provide benefits in the future? Efficient economic institutions do 
not always emerge spontaneously. What hampers emergence of efficient institutions? In what 
situations does adoption of the Code involve greater or lesser problems? Why is the introduction of 
                                                 
5 Following the authors of the Code, we define corporate governance as mechanisms securing protection of outside 
investors. This is how corporate governance is defined in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In recent years corporate 
governance has been interpreted more broadly – not only as a mechanism of securing investors’ return but also as 
provision of incentives within a company to invest in specific assets, including specific human capital (Zingales 1997, 
Bergloef and von Thadden, 1999). In other words, corporate governance is understood as a mechanism of transforming 
market signals into corporate behavior. This definition describes not only incentives for investors but also those for 
other stakeholders of a company – employees, creditors, suppliers and customers.  
6 The Federal Commission recommended traders and stock exchanges to require issuers to provide information on 
compliance with the Code standards as a condition of including securities in the quotation lists.  
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corporate governance institutions an equilibrium strategy in some countries and is not in others? 
This study intends to identify empirical regularities, which will pose further questions for theoretical 
and empirical research. The moment is unique: Russian corporate sector is presently undergoing a 
rapid institutional change; some firms have already improved their corporate governance, and others 
are going to follow very soon.   
 
1.2 Literature review  
New institutional economics defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990). 
Institutions are to promote efficient exchange of goods and services among economic agents. The 
main tenet of the new institutional economics concerning exceptional importance of institutions for 
attracting investment and economic growth is recognized increasingly widely among economists and 
is supported by theoretical and empirical research. For example, World Bank (1998) showed that 
countries with high quality of institutions but inefficient macroeconomic policies grew twice as fast 
as those with the opposite combination. 
The new institutional theory distinguishes between formal institutions built into constitutions, laws, 
the state structure, and informal institutions, such as standards of behavior, customs and traditions. 
Both are an integral part of the institutional environment. The question is whether they complement 
or substitute for one another and what their relative roles should be. This issue is discussed in 
Keefer and Shirley (2000) who show that in some cases informal institutions can indeed substitute 
for formal rules. However, one of the drawbacks of informal institutions is that only a limited 
number of players have access to them. In addition, informal institutions do not allow protection 
from crime and from arbitrary action by the government. Using China and Ghana as examples, 
Keefer and Shirley show that China has owed its success in attracting large foreign investment to the 
right combination of formal and informal institutions.   
Awareness of relative importance of formal and informal institutions helps making right choices in 
implementing institutional reforms. The development of the Corporate Conduct Code is 
undoubtedly an attempt to consolidate informal rules and standards of corporate governance in 
order to compensate, at least partly, for the lack of developed formal institutions, such as corporate 
legislation and the judicial system. 
Institutional changes are usually driven by shifts in relative prices (due to changes in relative prices 
of production factors, information costs, new technologies, or a change in tastes and preferences). 
The relative prices cause changes in incentives of economic agents. This, in turn, brings about the 
institutional change but only if expected benefits of transformation of institutions exceed the costs 
involved. However, costs (at least as seen by individual agents), are, as a rule, rather high, since a 
certain degree of stability and immunity to change is inherent in the nature of institutions. Hence 
institutional change occurs only when deviation of relative prices from the level at which existing 
institutions emerged, is fairly large. 
In terms of corporate governance, these issues may be reformulated as follows. Corporations often 
lack internal funds to finance new investment projects yielding positive discounted return. Funds 
could be borrowed in the credit market or raised in the stock market through issues of new equity. 
In either case the cost of capital will be lower if investors can be convinced that they will get high 
return. It is not so easy to do – managers and large shareholders have at their disposal an array of 
tools for expropriation of outside investors, such as asset stripping, transfer pricing, etc. (Johnson et 
al., 2000). Corporate governance mechanisms are essentially the institutions that curtail 
expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).7 Recent cross-country studies of ownership structure and 
                                                 
7 It is hard to apply traditional notion of demand and supply to institutions since there is no market for institutions. 
Nevertheless, in this study we are talking about the demand for institutions of corporate governance in a sense that 
enterprises have incentives to establish certain norms of corporate governance to attract investments and they are free to 
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corporate governance institutions have shown that in countries with weak legislative protection of 
small shareholder rights, ownership of companies is more concentrated (La Porta et al, 1999). If the 
legal environment cannot guarantee protection of small shareholders, companies cannot raise capital 
at a reasonable cost. 
How vital are these issues for Russia? In other words, how large is the misbalance between the 
Russian economy’s need for investment and the weak system of corporate governance? Do benefits 
provided by introduction of modern standards of corporate governance exceed costs for specific 
companies rather than for the economy as a whole? There are several studies showing that there is a 
correlation between corporate governance and investment attractiveness of companies in transition 
economies. Black (2001) attempted to estimate a relationship between the level of corporate 
governance and the undervaluation of Russian companies. Using the corporate governance ratings 
developed by Brunswick Warburg in the fall of 1999 and a ratio of actual market capitalization to 
potential capitalization measured by another investment bank (Troika-Dialog) for a sample of 21 
companies, Black found a significant correlation (See Figure 1.2.1).  
 
Figure 1.2.1. Improvement of corporate governance increases the market value of Russian 
companies 
The relationship between the market capitalization of the company and quality of corporate governance for 21 Russian 
blue chip companies in 1999. Source: Black (2001)   
 
Simple estimation shows that improvement of corporate governance from the level of Mosenergo to 
that of Vympelkom can triple or quadruple market capitalization. However, cross-section analysis is 
certainly insufficient. A more convincing analysis undoubtedly requires use of panel data. If it could 
really be shown that improvement of corporate governance in specific companies increases their 
capitalization with time, then the results would no longer depend on the choice of a model for 
calculation of “potential” capitalization. The analysis of panel data is carried out in Rachinsky (2003) 
who shows that the effect is indeed at least 7 times as weak. However, the effect of corporate 
governance on market valuation is positive, significant and still quite large: a one-point improvement 
                                                                                                                                                             
establish these norms. This approach is justified since institutions of corporate governance in Russia are mostly 
voluntary.  
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in the corporate governance index (either Brunswick or ICLG) raises market value by about 2 per 
cent.  
A convincing example of the relationship is the story of YUKOS oil company. It was one of the 
worst perpetrators of the investor rights in 1999, but has become the most transparent company in 
2001 and 2002 when it led the growth in ICLG Corporate Governance Ratings. During the 15 
months of the ICLG ratings (January 2001 to April 2002), Yukos capitalization has grown 5 times, 
while the RTS stock index only doubled.   
Corporate governance in listed companies was the focus of a survey conducted by the Association 
of Russian Managers and the Russian Institute of Directors (2001). The results of the survey suggest 
that top managers of a hundred Russian companies are prepared to adopt most of the standards 
provided by the Code, even if they are not sure that it will help to attract investment. 
However, very little attention is paid to companies with illiquid or unlisted shares. In 2001, there 
were about 60 thousand public companies and more than 370 thousand closely held corporations in 
Russia. Our paper takes a closer look at the question: to what extent these companies are interested 
in adoption of the Code. 
Underdevelopment of the equity market is not in itself an insurmountable obstacle to attracting 
outside investment. According to Becht et al. (2002), there are at least five ways to protect investor 
rights. They are (i) ownership concentration; (ii) the market for corporate control; (iii) delegation and 
concentration of control in the hands of the board of directors; (iv) executive compensation; (v) 
fiduciary duty. Liquidity of the equity market is exceptionally important for (iv), but the remaining 
mechanisms (with the exception of (v), which is hardly implementable in Russia), may be quite 
sufficient. This point is supported by Bergloef and Bolton (2002) who argue that in most Central 
and Eastern European countries investment is growing despite the underdeveloped stock markets. 
The main source of capital is foreign direct investment. Although the banking system is much more 
competitive in those countries than in Russia (due to the presence of foreign banks), bank loans 
mostly finance working capital rather than long-term projects. At the same time, as Bergloef and von 
Thadden (1999) point out, in transition economies large investors generally play a much more 
important role in corporate restructuring than small shareholders. Moreover, excessive protection of 
small shareholders may increase costs of takeover, thereby increasing transaction costs in the market 
for corporate control.8  
 
1.3 The methodology 
Using surveys of about 1,000 industrial enterprises and their official statistics, we shall try to 
establish relationships between the ownership structure, the level of corporate governance, demand 
for modern standards of corporate governance, and investment, depending on size, sectoral and 
regional characteristics. The methodology is predetermined by limitations due to Russian economic 
environment. First, non-transparency of the ownership structure, caused, among other things, by 
illegitimate nature of privatization and subsequent redistribution of ownership, causes us to rely on 
the results of ownership surveys, which reduces the size of the sample substantially.  
Second, inefficiency of Russian legal institutions may change the relationship between corporate 
governance and ownership structure. In the above literature, ownership structure is endogenous to 
the level of legal protection of investor rights. In an economy with developed financial markets and 
secure property rights, capital structure, specifically, ownership structure, is endogenous and 
depends on the structure of a business, intertemporal structure of revenue streams, the size of a 
company and the nature of uncertainty. At the same time, in Russia, high transaction costs in the 
                                                 
8 Radygin and Entov (1999), Radygin and Arkhipov (2001) also doubt the applicability of the Anglo-Saxon model of 
financial markets in Russia; the specific legal environment and structure of the economy may call for a special “Russian” 
model of corporate governance.     
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capital market slow down reallocation of corporate ownership. Certainly, ownership structure is not 
fully exogenous, but, as ownership changes more slowly than the level of corporate governance, we 
use the former as an exogenous variable. The low level of enforcement makes corporate governance 
an informal institution rather than a formal one. In developed countries the level of investor rights 
protection is mostly determined by legislation and thus is regarded as a given at the country level. In 
Russia corporate legislation is not enforced, hence protection of the rights of outside investors is 
voluntary rather than compulsory, with the level of corporate governance chosen at the firm level.  
The endogeneity of corporate governance to ownership structure results in a somewhat surprising 
empirical hypothesis. In developed countries the high level of corporate governance is negatively 
correlated with ownership concentration – if the law does not protect the rights of outside investors, 
small investors prefer not to buy shares. In Russia, on the contrary, good corporate governance and 
high ownership concentration can be correlated positively – in order to introduce institutions of 
corporate governance, investors should be interested in prosperity of the company.9 There may be 
different reasons why ownership concentration provides the controlling shareholder with incentives 
to protect rights of small investors. In the listed companies (or in the firms contemplating an IPO), 
the reason is simple: improved corporate governance raises market value. However, shares of most 
companies in our sample are not actively traded. In such firms, adoption of corporate governance 
mechanisms may be considered as a side deal between the controlling shareholder and small 
investors to prevent takeover. This mechanism should only work if the controlling shareholders lack 
the qualified majority to fend off all possible takeover threats. 
Another distinguishing feature of informal institutions is that their implementation does not, as a 
matter of fact, require changes in legislation. Why wait for drafting and approval by parliament of a 
corporate conduct code if mechanisms that it provides can be introduced already at this point? This 
argument means that the Code mainly serves as an information and educational tool.  
The paper is organized as follows. First it describes the sample and discusses the ownership 
structure of companies (Section 2). The following section attempts to find out how the current level 
of corporate governance depends on the size and ownership structure of a company, as well as 
sectoral and regional variables (Section 3).  Section 4 estimates the influence of corporate 
governance and ownership structure on investment and on sources of finance.10 Section 5 looks at 
the perception of the Code, estimating relationships between attitude to the Code as a whole or its 
specific standards, and the current level of corporate governance, ownership structure as well as 
sectoral and regional variables.  
                                                 
9 An important distinction refers to assumptions about incentives for managers and private benefits of control. For 
example, in models studied by Hart (1995), the manager is interested in investment in order to expand her “empire”. In 
Russia, the manager can obtain enormous private benefits without investment. The manager is interested in investment, 
which may bring profits only if he holds a sufficiently large stake in a business.      
10 We are not looking at how large the investment is. In many countries the low level of corporate governance results in 
excessive investment or investment failing to provide return on capital. We believe that the lack of investment in Russia 
in the 1990s makes any investment desirable. 
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2 The sample  
The study uses surveys of top managers of about one thousand industrial enterprises conducted by 
the Business Surveys Laboratory of the Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET). IET has 
developed and maintained a panel of top managers of industrial enterprises as part of monthly 
business surveys, which have been conducted since 1992 with the methodological support of the 
European Commission, Eurostat and OECD. The panel uses the “one enterprise-one-respondent” 
principle. The IET panel represents 22% of employment in the Russian industry. Chief executives 
account for 35% of the respondents, deputy directors – for 35%, and directors for economics and 
finance – 22% of the sample. 
The IET panel includes enterprises of mostly manufacturing industries in all Russian regions. A total 
of 61 sub-industries are identified. This ensures more representative data than sampling based only 
on broadly defined industries. The questionnaires are sent out and collected by mail, which allows 
geographic representation of the data to be expanded substantially. 
Figures 2.1-2.3 show the geographical and sectoral structure of the sample as well as distribution of 
enterprises by size (employment). Appendix compares the structure of the sample with that of the 
Russian industry as a whole (using the Goskomstat’s Register of Industrial Enterprises). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2.1. The sample represents enterprises from all Russian regions. As in Goskomstat’s 
Register, many enterprises are located in the Central Federal Okrug  
The graph presents the distribution of firms by regions. FO stands for Federal Okrug.  
Regional structure of the sample
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Moscow
Central FO (excluding
Moscow)
Far East FO
North Western FO
Siberian FO
Southern FO
Urals FO
Volga FO
Share of enterprises in the sample, %
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_______________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2.2. The sample represents enterprises of all industries. Similarly to Goskomstat’s 
Register, the machinery and metal processing accounts for the largest share 
The graph presents the distribution of firms by broad industries.  
 
Long-term confidential relations between IET and the respondents are especially important for this 
study. The reason is that most of the questions that we formulated are quite sensitive (at least in 
Russian environment), being concerned with corporate ownership and control. In September 2001, 
only 43% of respondents in IET surveys believed the official information on corporate ownership 
structure to be accurate. 
The use of survey-based statistics enabled us not only to obtain data on the ownership structure and 
the level of corporate governance, but also to find out managers’ attitudes to the principal 
provisions of the Code. 
Like most Russian enterprises, the companies in the sample do not have access to the stock market. 
There are no blue chip companies in the sample; none are on the RTS quotation lists of the first or 
even second tier. Only 30 companies (3% of the sample) are quoted in RTS, with shares of only 13 
of them having been traded in 20 deals exceeding $100,000.  
Table 2.4 presents data on the ownership structure. In companies with a large outside shareholder, 
such a shareholder controls the average of 40% of shares.11 The average stake controlled by the 
largest outside shareholder is 24% for our sample (including companies which do not have large 
outside owners). The average managerial stake is 19%. 
 
                                                 
11 Following literature on corporate governance, we deem outside shareholders to be all shareholders other than 
managers or employees of the company. The question arises whether it is appropriate to use the term of “outside” 
shareholders, who may de facto be affiliated with the management of the company. Certainly, it is difficult to trace such 
affiliations in practice.   
Sectoral structure of the sample
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Figure 2.3. The sample represents mostly medium-sized and large enterprises, although not 
the largest ones 
The graph presents the distribution of firms by size categories. 
 
 
Shareholder category 
Mean, 
% 
Median, 
% 
Standard 
deviation,  
% 
Number of 
observations
Management 19.3 6 26.1 641 
Largest outside shareholder 23.9 15 27.4 642 
All small shareholders controlling less than 
5% of shares 
23.6 12 28.3 581 
Only for enterprises where  
this category is present  
Management 27.7 16 27.2 448 
Largest outside shareholder 39.9 38 24.8 384 
All small shareholders controlling less than 
5% of shares 
37.0 30 27.5 370 
 
Table 2.4. Ownership structure 
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Figure 2.5 presents a histogram of distribution of shares by shareholder category. As Figure 2.5 
shows, the sample represents a wide variety of enterprises as regards ownership structure: 
enterprises with a dominant share of insiders, enterprises where an outside shareholder holds a 
majority or blocking stake,12 and those with a large share of small outside owners (each holding less 
than 5% of shares).  
The relationship between ownership structure and size is of special interest. As administrative costs 
of implementing the standards of the Code are relatively less important for large enterprises, 
demand for corporate governance should increase with size. Since the size of enterprises in our 
sample varies considerably,13 it can be assumed that the ownership structure of large enterprises is 
substantially different from that of small ones. Also, one could expect that the larger the enterprise, 
the less concentrated the ownership structure; given the underdeveloped financial markets, 
purchasing a large stake in a large company is very costly. On the other hand, weak protection of 
minority shareholder rights may produce an opposite effect: the larger the enterprise, the greater 
private benefits of control enjoyed by managers and large shareholders, the greater benefit large 
shareholders can derive from infringing the rights of small shareholders.   
 
Figure 2.5. Ownership structure is highly concentrated 
The figure shows histograms of distribution of shareholdings in the hands of (a) management, (b) the largest outside 
shareholder, (c) all small (smaller than 5% stakes) shareholders. The horizontal axis is the stake held by this category of 
shareholders on a percentage basis, the vertical axis is the share of relevant enterprises in which these shareholders hold 
the specified stake.  
The last diagram is a point-by-point plot of joint distribution of stakes held by the management and the largest outside 
shareholders. Each point represents an enterprise; the share of management in the ownership structure of this enterprise 
is plotted along the horizontal axis, the share of the largest outside shareholder - along the vertical axis.  
                                                 
12 As Figure 2.5 shows, large outside shareholders prefer to hold 25%, 50% and 75% stakes 
13 If the sample were sorted by sales, then the median enterprise of the upper half (i.e. the enterprise holding the 711th 
place by size in the sample of 948 enterprises, 711/948 = 75%) is 7.8 times larger than the median enterprise of the 
lower half (i.e. the enterprise holding the 237th  place in the sample, 237/948 - 25%).    
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As figure 2.6 shows, both effects take place. First, due to interaction of these countervailing effects 
there is no correlation between size (employment) and the share of small shareholders. Second, the 
share of the largest outside shareholder does increase with the size of an enterprise, while the 
management stake declines.14  
 
Figure 2.6. The larger the enterprise, the smaller the managerial share and the larger the 
share in the hands of large outside shareholders. The share of small shareholders does not 
depend on enterprise size. 
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The figure shows the relationship between the ownership structure and the size of the enterprise. The sample is broken 
down into nine groups by size (employment); the figure shows the average share of each ownership category, and the 
weight in of each size group in the entire sample (in parentheses).  
                                                 
14 The relationship is the same between ownership structure and another indicator of size - the sales. If one enterprise is 
10 times larger than another, then the average managerial share is 3.5% smaller, while the share of the largest outside 
owner is 4.3% larger. There is no correlation between sales and the share of small shareholders. However, the presence 
of small shareholders itself is really more likely at large enterprises (although the magnitude of the effect is small). At the 
same time, at enterprises with small shareholders, their combined stake declines as the size of the enterprise increases: 
with a 10-fold increase in sales the average share of small shareholders is 7.3% lower.       
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3 Quality of corporate governance in Russian industry 
The Code includes standards of corporate governance, which can be adopted voluntarily even 
before the approval of the Code. Hence, in order to evaluate the demand for corporate governance, 
it is important to study the present level of corporate governance in the company rather than the 
management’s intentions. This section presents the results of a study of the quality of corporate 
governance and factors affecting it.  
3.1 Measures of corporate governance 
To evaluate the quality of corporate governance, we formulated six relatively objective criteria, 
allowing evaluating various components of corporate governance. We asked the following questions: 
Question 1.  Do you use INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (US 
GAAP/IAS)? 
Question 2.  Does your company have a DEPARTMENT FOR SHAREHOLDERS AFFAIRS?  
Question 3.  Do you provide AGENDA of all shareholder meetings to all of your shareholders?  
Question 4.  Are there INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS on the Board of Directors of your 
company?   
Question 5.  Are there REPRESENTATIVES OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS on the 
board of directors of your company?  
Question 6.  Is your company’s registry of shareholders kept by an INDEPENDENT 
REGISTRAR? 
Not all of these norms are required by law. Providing agenda of shareholder meeting to all 
shareholders is stipulated by Russian corporate law. According to the Law on securities markets, if 
the number of security holders (including all types of shares and bonds) of the company exceeds 
500, company is obliged to keep its shareholder registry with an independent registrar. International 
accounting standards are required only for listed firms when they are included in first level listing.  
Answers to the questions of this questionnaire were provided by 672 public and 186 close 
companies. Distribution of the answers is shown in Figure 3.1.1. For each question, the upper bar 
shows distribution of answers of public companies, the lower bar – those of closely held companies. 
As can be seen from Figure 3.1.1, most indicators of corporate governance are similar for public and 
private companies. The only exception is the data on independent directors: they are much more 
often found on the boards of directors of public companies than on those of close companies. 
There is a substantial variation in specific components of the quality of corporate governance. An 
overwhelming majority of companies notify shareholders of the shareholders meeting in a timely 
manner, but only about half of them use the services of an independent registrar. Only a few 
companies maintain accounting by international standards and have minority shareholders 
represented on the board of directors. 
The components of corporate governance are positively correlated (Table 3.1.2). As can be seen 
from the table, there is a positive and significant correlation between all the components; for some 
components the correlation is very high. 
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Fig. 3.1.1.Level of corporate governance at Russian companies (both public and close) varies 
in a wide range. Quality of corporate governance at public companies is not much better 
than at the closely held ones. 
 The figure shows distribution of answers to questions 1 - 6 on the standards of corporate governance at a company. 
Answers provided by public companies (upper bar) and closely held companies (lower bar) are shown separately for 
each question. Dispersion of answers is fairly wide. The average number of positive answers (all questions) is 42%, 
negative answers - 53%. 
  
One of the reasons for the high correlation between answers to the questions is that they are partly 
driven by the same determinants, in particular by the size of an enterprise. Per unit costs of 
corporate governance are lower at larger companies, hence the larger the size, the higher the 
probability that the company has already adopted some corporate governance practices. Figure 3.1.3 
shows the relationship between the frequency of positive answers to the questions of the 
questionnaire and the numbers of employees, based on answers provided by 964 enterprises of 
various forms of ownership. Size does increase the likelihood that specific standards of corporate 
governance are used by the company. 15 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The positive significant correlation holds if we use sales (rather than employment) as a proxy for size. The correlation 
ranges from 14% (independent directors) to 28% (shareholder department).  
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Table 3.1.2. All components of corporate governance are correlated   
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6
Question 1 1      
Question 2 0.09* 1     
Question 3 0.07* 0.33* 1    
Question 4 0.05 0.15* 0.26* 1   
Question 5 0.07* 0.21* 0.21* 0.25* 1  
Question 6 0.08* 0.24* 0.46* 0.24* 0.23* 1 
* - significance at the 5% level 
  
   
Figure 3.1.3. The larger the enterprise, the higher the probability to adopt best practices of 
corporate governance  
The figure shows the correlation between the share of affirmative answers to questions about corporate governance and 
company size. The shares of positive answers are averaged over size groups, which are shown on the horizontal axis. 
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3.2 Corporate Governance Index 
Which of the six questions best describes the quality of corporate governance? Can a scalar index 
showing relative performance of companies as regards corporate governance be constructed? We 
checked if it is possible to build a linear ordering of the corporate governance elements, whether 
positive answer to one question implies positive questions to others. We have gone through all 
possible ordering; the best linear ordering is as following: international accounting standards ⇒ 
representatives of minority shareholders ⇒ independent directors ⇒ shareholder department ⇒ agenda of the annual 
meeting ⇒ independent registrar (i.e. if the company has IAS accounts, then it also has representatives of 
minority investors on the board etc). However, even this ordering includes only 514 firms out of 853 
who responded to all six questions. 
To build a scalar index of corporate governance, we used the principle component method. Table 
3.2.1. shows eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The first component explains 35 per cent of total 
variation, which is markedly more than the explanatory power of the second and third components 
(16 and 15 per cent, respectively). The weight of six questions in the first principal component is 
about the same.16  The weights of answers to the third (agenda) and sixth (independent registrar) 
questions in the first component are somewhat larger. The second component, on the contrary, is 
essentially comprised of the first question (international accounting standards) only. The third 
component includes the fourth and fifth questions with larger weight. 
 
Table 3.2.1. A third of the variation in the level of corporate governance is explained 
by the first principal component, in which all elements of corporate governance, 
except for the first one (IAS) are represented with practically equal weights.  
Component Eigenvalue 
Share of 
explained  
variation 
 Eigenvectors 
    1 2 3 
1 2.10 0.35 Question 1 0.15 0.97 0.14 
2 0.98 0.51 Question 2 0.41 0.10 -0.33 
3 0.89 0.66 Question 3 0.51 -0.09 -0.36 
4 0.81 0.80 Question 4 0.39 -0.18 0.57 
5 0.71 0.91 Question 5 0.39 -0.09 0.58 
6 0.51 1.00 Question 6 0.49 -0.07 -0.29 
 
The Corporate Governance Index (the first principal component) is distributed in the range from -
2.37 to 3.07 with a standard deviation of 1.45; the mean is normalized to zero. Figure 3.2.2. shows a 
histogram of distribution of its values. Although corporate governance of half of the enterprises is 
close to the average, a fairly large number of companies have either very good or very bad corporate 
governance.   
 
 
                                                 
16 Correlation between the first principal component and an unweighted sum of answers to all the six questions is 99%. 
Further on we still use the principal component rather than the unweighted sum, since the latter takes a very limited 
number of values.   
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Fig. 3.2.2. Corporate governance of almost half of enterprises is close to average, but a fairly 
large number of enterprises have either very bad or very good corporate governance.  
The distribution of the Corporate Governance Index (the first principal component of the six questions). The vertical 
axis is the share of companies with the relevant range of the Corporate Governance Index in the sample. The value of 
the Corporate Governance Index less than -2 represents negative answers to all six questions, the value higher than 2 
corresponds to positive answers to five or six questions. 
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3.3 Determinants of the quality of corporate governance 
In this section we study the relationship between corporate governance and ownership structure, 
sectoral and regional variables, etc. For simplicity we do not carry out a separate analysis for answers 
to each of the questions but study the determinants of the Corporate Governance Index introduced 
above.  
The Corporate Governance Index increases with concentration of ownership in hands of 
management or by largest outside blockholder as long as concentration is not too high; then the 
quality of corporate governance begins to fall. Figure 3.3.1 presents the joint distribution of 
ownership concentration and index of corporate governance. Both for the management stake and 
for the case of largest outside blockholder, the relationship is bell-shaped with the largest part of the 
sample being located to the left of the peak. We estimated quadratic relationships of the corporate 
governance index on ownership concentration. It turns out that quadratic form functions describe 
the dependence of corporate governance index on the concentration of ownership much better than 
linear ones. Concentration of ownership in hands of outside blockholder improves corporate 
governance up to the level where ownership stake exceeds 50%, while for the management stake the 
threshold value is only 16%.   
To control for other determinants of corporate governance, we run OLS regressions (Table 3.1.2).17 
The effect of ownership structure on corporate governance is significant.18 An increase in the small 
shareholders’ stake is, as expected, correlated with better corporate governance. However, the 
relationship between corporate governance and the management’s as well as a large outside owner’s 
stakes is less obvious. It turns out that the larger the managerial and a large outside owner’s stakes, 
the better corporate governance. Thus, consolidation of the stake provides incentives for large inside 
and outside investors to improve corporate governance.  
However, as shown by specifications (4) - (6), this effect is not monotonic or at least not linear. 
Specification (4) estimates quadratic relationship. The coefficient at the squared share of the largest 
                                                 
17 Regressions for specific components of corporate governance produce similar results.   
18 The use of ownership structure as an exogenous variable in this and other regressions is discussed in Section 1.3.  
Fig. 3.3.1. Concentration of ownership up to a certain level is related to increasing level of 
corporate governance. Excessive concentration results in worse corporate governance.   
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The charts present relationship between the Corporate Governance Index and the shares of stock held by management and 
by largest outside blockholder. Figures under each column indicate range of ownership shares and weight of this category 
of ownership in the sample (in parentheses). Height of each column equals to the average CGI in this category.     
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outside owner is negative and significant.. The effect of concentration of ownership on corporate 
governance is positive if the large outside owner holds a small stake, but becomes negative once the 
stake exceeds approximately 50%. The coefficient at the squared share of the management is also 
negative but is not significant. 
Columns (5) and (6) present further tests of the non-monotonicity of the relationship between 
concentration of ownership and corporate governance. Column (6) shows the estimates for the 
companies where the stake of the largest outsider shareholder exceeds 50%. It turns out that for this 
(albeit a very small) subsample concentration of ownership does affect corporate governance 
negatively and significantly. Column (5) presents the estimates for a piecewise linear specification; 
we allow different slopes for companies with high and low ownership concentration. Again, the 
effect of ownership concentration on corporate governance is positive and significant as long 
concentration is sufficiently low; after then the effect becomes significantly lower (and, actually, 
does not significantly differ from zero).  
Therefore, an increase of the stake in the hands of management or the largest outside owner 
positively affects corporate governance until this stake exceeds certain level. Once the concentration 
is sufficiently high, the effect becomes negative (in some specifications) or insignificant. In case of 
outside blockholders, the critical level of concentration is 50%, in the case of managerial stake it is 
much lower. 19 A relatively small number of firms with ownership concentration above the critical 
level does not allow us claiming whether corporate governance worsens or remains the same with 
further increase in concentration of ownership.  
The source of the bell-shaped relationship may be as follows. If one shareholder holds a qualified 
majority, then voluntary institutions of corporate governance cannot protect small investors 
anymore, hence it does not make sense to implement them.  
The other variables play a less important role. In all specifications, corporate governance improves 
with size. Availability of funds on the company account (variable Liquidity = cash balance/annual 
sales) worsens corporate governance – companies which have idle cash do not need to attract 
outside investors. We have also included financial indicators, such as ratio of liquid assets to short-
term receivables and labor productivity relative to industry average (for 5-digit industries). These 
variables are not significant. Effect of the share of exports in revenues is insignificant, probably due 
to sectoral differences. Closely held corporations have a lower level of corporate governance but 
differences are insignificant in most of the specifications.  
Industry-level variation in the level of corporate governance is presented in Table 3.3.3. Average 
value of the index of corporate governance differs significantly by industry. However, if we control 
for other factors, including size of a firm and export orientation, only forestry, food industry and 
construction materials industry significantly differ from others, having lower quality of corporate 
governance.  
                                                 
19 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) evaluate the relationship between the managerial ownership and the market value 
of the company and find it to be nonlinear. Managerial ownership affects the value of the company positively if the 
managers’ stake is no more than 5%, and negatively if the stake is 5% to 25%,  positively again if this share exceeds 25%. 
The authors explain this by combination of two opposite effects: the positive impact of incentives created by ownership, 
and the negative effect of the entrenchment of managers when their stake increases.    
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Table 3.3.2. Determinants of corporate governance. The dependent variable is the Corporate 
Governance Index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mgmt 0.561* 0.764** 0.682* 0.892* 3.638** -2.014+ 
LargeOutside 0.949** 1.080** 0.856** 2.070** 2.731** -2.138* 
Small  0.984** 0.788* 0.786** 0.701**  
Mgmt_sq     -0.637   
LOutside_sq     -3.697**   
Mgmt*  
*( Mgmt >0.25) 
    -2.911**  
LOutside *  
*( LOutside>0.50)
    -1.887**  
Log sales 0.226** 0.225** 0.277** 0.213** 0.221** 0.133+ 
Liquidity   -3.584+    
Export/sales 0.589 0.571 0.302 0.470 0.737+ 0.163 
Closely held 
dummy 
-0.217 -0.311+ -0.479* -0.198 -0.221 -0.511 
Industries nonsign. nonsign. nonsign. + + ** 
Moscow -0.870** -0.933* -0.820 -0.692** -0.845** -1.865** 
Far-East FO 0.347 0.165 0.166 0.079 0.068 -0.562 
N-West FO 0.034 0.061 0.431 0.008 0.003 0.657 
NFO -0.299 -0.458+ -0.669* -0.523** -0.475+ -1.042+ 
SFO -0.052 -0.198 -0.063 -0.245 -0.273 -0.214 
UFO -0.754** -0.770** -0.407 -0.831** -0.772** -1.119+ 
PFO -0.200 -0.251 -0.092 -0.164 -0.161 -0.354 
Observations 327 300 217 300 300 73 
R2 0.25 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.36 0.56 
+significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. The table presents OLS estimates with robust standard 
errors. The definitions, descriptions and summary statistics of the variables are given in the Appendix. The dependent 
variable is the Corporate Governance Index described above. Columns (1)-(5) present estimates for the whole sample, 
column (6) includes observations where the largest outside blockholder holds more than 50% stock. LOutside_sq is the 
squared mean adjust share of the LargeOutside, i.e. LOutside_sq = (LargeOutside-0.24)2. LOutside>0.50 is a dummy 
for observations where the largest outside blockholder holds more than 50% shares. 
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Table 3.3.3. Corporate governance is significantly worse in forestry, food industry and 
construction materials industry (both in averages and in regression results).   
Industries CG Index, average 
(std.deviation in parentheses) 
Regression coefficient 
(std.error in parentheses) 
11 Power and fuel  0.77 
(1.46) 
-0.56 
(0.40) 
12 Iron and steel,  
non-ferrous metals 
0.65 
(1.38) 
0.18 
(0.34) 
13 Chemicals and petrochemistry 0.26 
(1.54) 
0.24 
(0.31) 
14 Machinery and metalworking 0.12 
(1.58) 
0 
15 Forestry, woodworking, pulp and 
paper 
-0.49 
(1.40) 
-0.62** 
(0.23) 
16 Construction materials -0.38 
(1.15) 
-0.49* 
(0.22) 
17 Light industry -0.04 
(1.29) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
18 Food-processing -0.07 
(1.21) 
-0.39* 
(0.20) 
19 Other -0.43 
(1.29) 
-0.94 
(0.57) 
 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In columns 5 and 6 we present coefficients and standard errors of industry 
dummies from regression for CG index (Table 3.3.1., specification (5)). Base category is machinery and metalworking. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3.4. Corporate governance by industry.  
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Picture presents average values of corporate governance index (left scale) and coefficients of industry dummies (relative to 
machine building) from regression (last column of Table 3.3.2) for corresponding industries.  
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4 Investment 
The main purpose of any corporate governance reform is improvement of the investment climate, 
creation of conditions for attracting outside investment. In this Section we shall attempt to estimate 
the relationship between the investment as well as sources of finance and the Corporate Governance 
Index constructed in the previous section. Results obtained above raise doubts that corporate 
governance affects investment directly. Russian companies (at least those in our sample) are very 
different from the model of “separation of ownership and control” by Berle and Means (1932): 
many of those companies are controlled by one outside or inside owner; hence investment does not 
necessarily have to depend on small shareholders protection. Moreover, the nonlinearities discussed 
above suggest that the relationship between corporate control and investment may be very complex. 
4.1 Investment and sources of finance 
Table 4.1.1 shows answers provided by companies to the question whether they invest and what 
financing they use. Most of the companies (77.6%) reported that they invested in the year prior to 
the survey. Investment was mostly financed from internal funds. Only 20% of enterprises financed 
investment through bank loans, less than 1% – through new equity issues. Only seven firms in a 
sample ever issued bonds.  These figures are consistent with Goskomstat data about the situation in 
Russian industry as a whole (see Appendix). It should be noted that results obtained are not very 
different from data for transition (Bergloef and Bolton) and developed countries (Myers, 2000). 
 
Table 4.1.1. Investment and sources of finance 
 Share of companies, % 
No investment 22.4 
Investment using internal sources 66.1 
  including investment using only internal sources 49.3 
Bank loans 21.3 
New share issues 0.7 
Other sources 6.2 
Number of companies 947 
 
Distribution of answers to the question «What finance sources did you use for investment in the past (2001) year? ». The 
sum of answers exceeds 100% because respondents could choose more than one answer.  
    
Table 4.1.2 presents various characteristics of companies with regard to the sources of finance. 
Ownership structure does not play a major role, with the sole exception of the share of small 
shareholders. The larger the stake controlled by small shareholders, the less outside investment the 
company attracts.20 
 
                                                 
20 This counterintuitive relationship disappears in OLS regressions once we control for other determinants of investment 
finance. However, the negative correlation between the number of small shareholders and investment attraction may be 
due to an increase in company management costs where there are small investors.  
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Table 4.1.2. Company characteristics as regards investment finance sources 
 Investment finance sources 
 Total None Own funds Loans Share issues Other 
Average share of a large outside owner 23.9 22.8 23.8 26.8 30.4 29.5 
Average managerial stake 19.3 17.2 20.4 19.7 6.0 13.6 
Average stake of small shareholders 23.6 24.8 24.6 18.6 36.4 26.5 
Corporate Governance Index 0 -0.2 0.2 0.2 1.9 -0.2 
At what HIGHEST rate of interest are 
you prepared to take a LONG-TERM 
bank loan?       
1) not required 25.8 36.0 29.1 19.8 14.3 33.3 
2) 5-10% 52.3 55.6 64.3 70.9 85.7 62.8 
3) 11-20% 5.7 7.4 6.1 9.3 0.0 2.0 
4) >20% 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Industries      
11.Power and fuel 3.9 0.9 4.8 2.4 0.0 6.8 
12. Metallurgy 4.4 3.1 5.3 7.3 0.0 0.0 
13. Chemicals 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 33.3 6.8 
14. Machinery 38.5 38.3 42.4 35.4 44.4 32.2 
15. Woodworking 10.9 13.7 9.5 8.3 11.1 15.3 
16. Construction materials 9.5 11.0 9.1 7.8 0.0 10.2 
17. Light 13.2 18.5 10.1 13.1 11.1 11.9 
18. Food-processing 13.4 8.4 13.1 18.0 0.0 13.6 
19. Other 1.8 1.8 1.3 3.4 0.0 3.4 
Size       
1-500 employees 34.3 49.3 28.0 30.1 22.2 25.4 
500-1000 employees 25.7 27.3 25.0 19.9 0.0 33.9 
1000-5000 employees 32.0 21.2 35.5 38.4 66.7 33.9 
over 5000 employees 8.0 2.2 11.6 11.7 11.1 6.8 
Number of firms 1261 227 640 206 9 59 
Figures in the left column are means for each category of investment and source of finance.  
    
Sectoral characteristics are also important. Exporting industries invest more but mostly from own 
funds. Industries selling to the domestic market invest less and have to rely on outside sources of 
finance. 
The question about the interest rate at which a company is prepared to take loans gives an idea of 
the rate of return on investment projects, or at least of the management’s perception of return. 
Answers cited in Table 4.1.2  show that enterprises with a low rate of return tend not to invest or 
invest relying on their own funds (less frequently), while companies with a higher rate of return 
invest, relatively often relying on outside sources of finance. 
The most interesting result is the absence of correlation between investment and corporate 
governance. Although there is a positive relationship between investment and the Corporate 
Governance Index, the magnitude of the effect is small. In addition, corporate governance does not 
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affect access to credit. Certainly, corporate governance substantially enhances the chances of raising 
capital by new share issues (this effect is statistically significant), but the number of such companies 
in our sample is very small.  
 
4.2 Determinants of investment 
Table 4.2.1. shows the results of estimation of correlation between investment and some variables, 
such as ownership structure, size, profitability, sectoral and regional features, share of exports in 
sales, etc. These results suggest that if size, sector and ownership structure are controlled for, 
investment does not depend on corporate governance. Since corporate governance and ownership 
structure are correlated, it is important that the effect of ownership structure is significant, while that 
of corporate governance is not. Consolidation of ownership in the hands of administration and a 
large outside owner increases the probability of investment (at a given level of corporate 
governance), while the effect of corporate governance is not significant. 
This may be explained by the excessive concentration of ownership. To test this hypothesis we 
included variable Small*CGI (the small shareholders’ stake multiplied by the Corporate Governance 
Index) in the regression. The coefficient is positive and significant – the share of small shareholders 
and the level of corporate governance are complementary in terms of investment. The larger the 
share in the hands of small shareholders, the more corporate governance affects investment.21   
We also included term Mgmt*CGI in the regression in order to see whether the relationship between 
consolidation of ownership in the hands of management and corporate governance is substitutional 
or complementary.22  The coefficient at the Mgmt*CGI is negative and significant, which means that 
corporate governance and ownership concentration are substitutes. Although the level of corporate 
governance does not affect investment by itself, it weakens the positive effect of ownership 
consolidation in the hands of management. The higher the level of outside shareholder protection, 
the less control each additional percent of shares gives the management, and, consequently, the less 
investment there is. The effect of the other factors is predictable: the size and profitability of the 
company increase the likelihood of investment. The fuel and energy sector invests much more than 
others. Sectoral variables absorb the effect of the share of exports in sales; the latter is insignificant. 
 
 
                                                 
21 In specification (3), the effect of the CGI equals -0,016+0.129*Small. Thus in the absence of small shareholders, the 
effect of corporate governance is insignificant (even negative). However, if the share of small shareholders is, for 
example, 50%, then the effect of corporate governance is positive and quite large (-0.016+0.129*0.5=0.048).   
22 We also attempted to include LOutside*CGI in the regression, the coefficient at this variable was insignificant, while 
the other coefficients did not change. 
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Table 4.2.1. Investment does not depend on corporate governance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log sales 0.064** 0.048** 0.043** 0.070** 
Profitability 0.498** 0.580** 0.515** 0.763** 
Demand for credit 0.029 0.023 0.036  
Mgmt 0.100 0.146+ 0.117+ 0.196* 
Large outside 0.161* 0.139* 0.112* 0.133+ 
Small  0.061 0.054 0.033  
CGI -0.012 0.018 -0.016 0.006 
Mgmt*CGI  -0.156** -0.112* -0.150* 
Small*CGI    0.129**  
Exports -0.057 -0.030 -0.050 0.027 
Metallurgy -0.963** -0.971** -0.981** -0.953** 
Chemicals -0.963** -0.972** -0.981** -0.948** 
Machinery -0.972** -0.989** -0.991** -0.985** 
Woodworking -0.956** -0.983** -0.990** -0.974** 
Construction materials -0.966** -0.976** -0.985** -0.967** 
Light -0.979** -0.985** -0.992** -0.975** 
Food-processing -0.954* -0.979* -0.948** -0.975** 
Reconstruction plan    0.030 
Number of observations 188 188 188 231 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.30 
+ significant at the 10%level; * significant at the 5%level; ** significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable takes 
the value of 0 if there was no investment in the previous year and the value of 1 if there was investment. The table 
presents estimates of marginal effects obtained by a probit regression. Regional variables (not shown) are insignificant. 
CGI is the Corporate Governance Index. 
  
4.3 Determinants of sources of finance 
Corporate governance may affect not only availability of investment but also the sources of 
investment finance. Table 4.3.1. presents estimates of the relationship between the probability of 
outside investment (if any) and various characteristics of a company. Most of the factors are 
insignificant, including size, ownership structure and corporate governance. Outside investment is 
mainly explained by only two variables: available liquid assets and the existence of a reconstruction 
plan. This suggests that outside finance is costlier than internal funds. Note that inclusion in the 
regression of the variable Liquidity doubles the explanatory power of the regression. 
The availability of the reconstruction plan doubles the probability of financing from outside sources. 
This is also a predictable result but it raises another question: what does the existence of the plan 
itself depend on? The Appendix provides the results of regressions, which show that the presence of 
a reconstruction plan is positively correlated with the size of the company and the stake held by the 
largest outside owner. 
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Another interesting result is that in some specifications the share of small shareholders adversely 
affects the probability of outside investment. This, however, is unsurprising, given that the bulk of 
outside investment is financed by bank loans rather than share issues.  
Remark. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 estimate the relationships for the availability of investment and for 
investment finance sources separately. These variables are certainly not independent and should, as a 
matter of fact, be estimated jointly. The Appendix provides the results of multinomial logit 
estimation, which are not different from probit-estimates of sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3.1. External finance is more likely in firms who have less cash and in firms that 
have a reconstruction plan. Ownership structure and corporate governance do not 
significantly affect the sources of finance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log sales -0.006 -0.004 -0.022 0.031 -0.042 -0.011 
Liquidity  -3.476** -3.028*  -0.892 -2.593** -3.676** 
Reconstruction 
plan 
0.180*  0.067 0.177* 0.186* 0.189* 
Manager -0.204 -0.244 -0.099 -0.140 -0.053 -0.224 
Large outside 0.063 0.136 0.193 0.069 0.102  
Small -0.279+ -0.314* -0.196 -0.170  -0.288+ 
CGI 0.003 0.017 0.018  0.012 0.004 
Exports 0.026 -0.007 -0.095 -0.042 -0.049 0.035 
Far East 0.126 0.098 -0.103 0.079 0.093 0.132 
North  West -0.063 -0.069 -0.088 -0.053 -0.111 -0.085 
Siberia 0.214 0.232 0.127 0.266+ 0.049 0.206 
South -0.220 -0.192 -0.159 -0.209+ -0.241+ -0.220 
Urals 0.199 0.186 0.191 0.060 0.173 0.204 
Volga 0.222* 0.232* 0.093 0.219* 0.237* 0.230* 
Number of 
observations 
157 158 201 203 176 159 
Pseudo  R2 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.20 
+ significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. The table presents estimates of 
marginal effects obtained by the probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the company invested 
using only own funds and the value of 1 in the opposite case (only for companies which invested). Sectoral variables 
were included in the regression but are not shown (insignificant). 
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5 The Code of Corporate Conduct  
The previous sections studied measures to improve corporate governance, which were actually 
implemented by companies, and inside and outside investment. In this section we are interested in 
managers’ attitude towards the Code per se and their intentions to adopt specific rules and norms of 
the Code. 
5.1 Awareness of the Code 
The study of attitudes towards the Code should begin with an evaluation of companies’ awareness 
of its existence and specific rules and standards provided by it. A third of respondents said that they 
had general understanding of the Code or knew it in detail. 
Fig. 5.1.1. Every third company is familiar with the Code but only 4% of them know its 
contents in detail.  
Distribution of answers. 100%=887 companies. This was only one of many questions of the questionnaire (see 
Appendix). Ten per cent of respondents who answered at least one question of the questionnaire did not answer this 
question.  
 
Seven questions of the questionnaire were concerned with acceptability of specific provisions and 
standards of the Code. Companies were to choose from three alternative answers supplied 
(acceptable, unacceptable, and hard to tell). Companies familiar with the Code were more likely to 
answer positively, which points to the educational role of the Code. 
 
Are you familiar with the Corporate Conduct 
Code prepared by the Federal Securities Commission?
57%
29%
4% 10%
no answer
no
yes, in general
yes, in detail
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Table 5.1.2. Companies familiar with the code answer questions about acceptability of its 
specific rules and standards in a more definite way 
 
Could not answer all 7 questions 
about acceptability of specific 
provisions of  the Code 
Answered definitely at least one 
question about acceptability of 
specific provisions of the Code 
Total
Not familiar with the 
Code 123 280 403
Familiar with the Code 24 244 268
Total 147 524 671
 
5.2 Demand for corporate governance 
Table 5.2.1 provides summary statistics of answers by 886 companies to the questions about 
acceptability of specific provisions of the Code and the Code as a whole, as a percentage of the 
number of respondents. The acceptability of various provisions of the Code varies greatly, while the 
question about acceptability of the Code as a whole was answered by a markedly smaller number of 
companies. Companies, which did not answer the question about acceptability of the Code as a 
whole, also were less likely to answer definitely to questions on specific provisions.  
Figure 5.2.2 shows the distribution of answers to all of the seven questions of the questionnaire 
about the acceptability of specific rules and standards of the Code. The peak in the upper corner 
represents 159 companies, which could not provide a definite answer to any of the seven questions. 
Six companies answered that all provisions and standards of the Code were unacceptable to them 
(the bottom right-hand corner). The largest number of companies is closer to the bottom left-hand 
corner. These companies answered that most provisions of the Code were acceptable to them. 
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Table 5.2.1. Company managers find most provisions of the Code acceptable except for the 
requirements for information disclosure and appointment of independent directors 
 
yes, all companies 
with more than 
1,000 shareholders 
must do so 
yes, we are all 
prepared to that 
voluntarily 
No Total
 Percentage of all firms in the sample 
Are you prepared to disclose information 
about degree of conformity of your 
corporate governance practices to the 
recommendations of the Code? 
14 33 20 67 
What do you think of acceptability of 
adoption by your company of key 
provisions of the Code (taking into 
account the required “cash” costs) 
acceptable unacceptable not sure Total
Allowing all shareholders full, equal and 
timely access to information about the 
company (specifically at a shareholders 
meeting) 
49 8 28 85 
Information disclosure to public at large (in 
a prospectus, quarterly and annual reports) 28 23 33 84 
Control over insider information, 
compliance with prohibition to use 
confidential insider information about the 
company for private purposes 
24 7 52 84 
Election of independent directors to the 
board of directors 27 22 35 84 
Safeguarding of small shareholder rights in 
conducting major deals and reorganizations 
(preemptive right, approval by the general 
meeting) 
28 17 39 84 
Engagement of an independent appraiser in 
conducting major deals and reorganizations, 
independent audit 
48 7 29 84 
Clear rules for dividend distribution 49 5 30 84 
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Figure 5.2.2 Most of the companies that are familiar with specific provisions of the Code 
find them acceptable.    
al
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 a
cc
ep
ta
bl
e
al
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
un
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
150-160
50-60
40-50
30-40
20-30
10-20
0-10
Number of companies
 
The figure shows the distribution of answers to the questions about acceptability of specific provisions and standards of 
the Code. The horizontal axes are the numbers of provisions of the Code which this company finds acceptable (the left 
axis) and unacceptable (the right axis). The number of companies is plotted along the vertical axis (indicated also in 
color). The distribution has two peaks. First, the peak in the far corner, showing companies which found it difficult to 
appraise acceptability of all of the seven provisions. The second peak is on the left, i.e. it represents companies, which 
find most of the provisions or standards acceptable. There are practically no companies in the right part of the diagram. 
Thus, companies which are prepared to appraise acceptability of specific provisions, find them more acceptable than 
unacceptable. 
 
The larger number of provisions is acceptable to the company, the higher the probability that the 
Code is acceptable as a whole. This relationship is shown in Figure 5.2.3.  
Answers to the questions about acceptability of specific provisions of the Code are correlated with 
one another (Table 5.2.4). To construct the scalar index of firms’ attitude to the Code, we used the 
method of principal components. The results are shown in Table 5.2.5. The first component 
explains 30 per cent of the total variation, which is markedly more than the explanatory power of 
the second and third components (14 per cent each). The weights of the seven questions in the first 
principal component are roughly equal.23    
Thus, in addition to information on acceptability of the Code as a whole, we constructed the index 
of demand for specific provisions and standards of the Code. 
                                                 
23 Correlation between the first principal component and the unweighted sum of positive answers to the questions about 
specific provisions of the Code less the sum of negative answers is 97%.   
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Figure 5.2.3 The greater number of Code provisions and standards are acceptable to the 
Company, the higher probability that the Code is acceptable as a whole  
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The figure shows distribution of answers with respect to specific provisions of the Code. The horizontal axis plots the 
algebraic sum of answers to the seven questions about acceptability of specific provisions or standards of the Code. The 
percentages below the horizontal axis show the weight of each category in the sample. 
 
Table 5.2.4. Attitudes to specific provisions of the Code are correlated. 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Q1 1             
Q2 0.21** 1           
Q3 0.20** 0.17** 1         
Q4 0.03 0.08* 0.07+ 1       
Q5 0.23** 0.10** 0.17** 0.12** 1     
Q6 0.35** 0.12** 0.22** 0.15** 0.28** 1   
Q7 0.24** 0.05 0.22** 0.13** 0.14** 0.35** 1 
+ significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level 
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Table 5.2.5. The first principal component explains a third of variation in demand for 
specific provisions of the Code.   
Component Eigenvalue 
Share of 
explained 
variation 
 Eigenvectors 
    1 2 3 
1 2.10 0.30 Question1 0.45 0.25 -0.24 
2 1.01 0.45 Question 2 0.26 0.67 0.48 
3 0.97 0.58 Question 3 0.37 0.22 -0.04 
4 0.87 0.71 Question 4 0.21 -0.51 0.78 
5 0.81 0.82 Question 5 0.37 -0.03 0.07 
6 0.65 0.92 Question 6 0.50 -0.19 -0.17 
7 0.59 1.00 Question 7 0.41 -0.38 -0.28 
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5.3 Determinants of the demand for corporate governance 
The first step to introduce the Code is to make sure that companies are ready to disclose whether 
they comply with the Code’s recommendations. The lack of answer to the question about 
acceptability of the Code as a whole, if the company answered other Code-related questions of the 
questionnaire, is regarded as unwillingness of the company to disclose information on the 
compliance of its practices to recommendations of the Code. Therefore we start our analysis with 
studying the determinants of the readiness to disclose information on compliance with the Code. 
We introduce the binary variable Demand which is defined as in Table 5.3.1. 
 
Table 5.3.1. Half of companies have a positive attitude to the Code. 
Independent 
variable 
Demand 
Number of 
observations 
Are you prepared to disclose information about degree of 
compliance of your corporate governance practices with the 
recommendations of the Code? 
Number of 
observations 
 
No answer 295 
0 474 
No 179 
Yes, we are prepared to do so voluntarily after the Code has been 
published 289 
1 413 
Yes, all companies with more than 1,000 shareholders must do 
so  124 
Total 887  887 
 
Table 5.3.2 presents the results of estimations of determinants of the demand for the Code. The 
demand is determined by awareness and demand for specific provisions and standards. Table 5.3.3 
adds all variables describing ownership structure in more detail. The higher the share of outside 
shareholders, the higher demand for the Code. Moreover, the impact of the share of small 
shareholders is about double the impact of the stake of the largest outside investor.  
We also checked whether the demand depends on the availability of liquid assets and on the interest 
rate that the company is prepared to pay for a long-term loan. Neither these nor other variables 
affect demand for the Code significantly. Of all questions related to investment, the presence of a 
reconstruction plan has the greatest impact on demand for the Code.     
Thus, demand for the Code as a whole depends on the attitude to its specific provisions and 
standards. What does acceptability of specific provisions of the Code depend on? Table 5.3.4 
presents factors affecting demand7 – the fist principal component constructed based on the seven 
questions about acceptability of specific provisions and standards of the Code. Demand for the 
specific provisions depends primarily on the share of small shareholders and the Corporate 
Governance Index., i.e. to what extent the standards of the Code are already introduced in the 
company. Other things equal, the demand for specific provisions of the Code declines with the 
share of exports in sales. 
Another result confirms the presence of externalities in corporate governance at the sectoral level. 
As we can see from Table 5.3.4., average level of corporate governance in the firm’s industry 
positively affects the firm’s demand for corporate governance.  Apparently, if other firms in an 
industry have high level of corporate governance then the firm has to introduce good corporate 
governance in order to attract investors. This result is not trivial: one could also expect an opposite 
effect. Indeed, if the level of corporate governance in the industry is low, the firm that is first to 
improve its corporate governance practices has a first mover advantage. However, such a strategy is 
also risky, since the costs of disclosure are higher if others remain non-transparent. The positive 
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effect of other firms’ corporate governance practices on a firm’s demand for corporate governance 
is even stronger than the effect of the firm’s own current corporate governance.   
 
Table 5.3.2.Demand for the Code is determined by people’s awareness of the document 
itself or its specific provisions and standards, by specific standards of the Code, by existence 
of small shareholders. 
 (1) (2) Comments 
No_answer7 -0.554** -0.609** 
Companies, which had difficulty answering 
questions about acceptability of specific 
standards of the Code, are less prepared to 
accept the Code as a whole. 
Demand7 0.104**  
The larger number of provisions of the Code is 
acceptable to companies, the higher the 
likelihood that the Code will be acceptable as a 
whole. 
No_answer_Code -0.146* -0.146** Companies unfamiliar with the Code show lower demand for it 
Reconstruction plan 0.187** 0.193** Companies, which have a reconstruction plan, show a greater demand for the Code. 
Small 0.137 0.171+ Companies with a larger share of small shareholders show greater demand for the Code
Exports -0.044 -0.149 Share of exports in company revenues does not affect demand for the Code 
Log sales 0.011 0.012 Company size (sales) does not affect demand for the Code 
Number of observations 472 472  
Pseudo  R2 0.32 0.29  
+ significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level. Estimates of marginal effects 
obtained by the probit regression are presented. The dependent variable is Demand. Sectoral and regional variables were 
included in the regression but are not shown. Regional variables are insignificant. Sectoral variables are significant: 
Metallurgy and construction materials companies have greater demand for the Code. Demand 7 is the first principal 
component constructed in section 5.2 
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Table 5.3.3 Companies with a larger share of small and large outside shareholders have 
greater demand for the Code as a whole  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No_answer7 -0.554** -0.530** -0.512** -0.611** -0.556**
Demand7 0.104** 0.115** 0.101**  0.104**
No_answer_Code -0.146* -0.177** -0.163** -0.146* -0.150**
Reconstruction plan  0.187** 0.164** 0.157** 0.195** 0.189**
Mgmt  -0.129  -0.083 -0.067 
Large outside   0.067 0.068 
Small 0.137   0.141 0.105 
Exports -0.044 -0.091 0.014 -0.167 -0.066 
Log sales 0.011 0.019 -0.002 0.021 0.022 
Number of observations 472 523 519 461 461 
Pseudo  R2 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.32 
+ significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level. The table presents estimates of 
marginal effects obtained by the probit regression. The dependent variable is Demand. Sectoral and regional variables 
were included in the regression but are not shown. Regional variables are insignificant. Sectoral specifics are significant 
and similar to those in Table 5.3.2 
Table 5.3.4. Demand for the Code’s norms increases with the current level of corporate 
governance in the company and in its industry and with the share of small shareholders. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No_answer_Code -0.193 -0.243+ -0.242+ -0.246+ -0.214 
CGI 0.148* 0.145* 0.148* 0.144* 0.136+ 
CGI_Industry  0.832* 0.823* 0.835* 0.716+ 
Reconstruction plan 0.12 0.102  0.107 0.109 
Demand for credit   -0.001   
Mgmt     -0.332 
Large outside     0.27 
Small 0.540* 0.477+ 0.454+ 0.482+ 0.455+ 
Exports -0.919+ -0.866+ -0.871+ -0.871+ -0.881+
Log sales -0.032 -0.01 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 
Liquidity    -0.766  
Number of observations 400 400 400 400 391 
Pseudo  R2 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
+ significant at the 10%level; * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. The table presents estimates 
from OLS regressions for Demand7 (the principal component of answers to the seven questions about acceptability of 
specific standards f the Code). Regional variables were included in the regressions but are not shown as they are 
insignificant. Sectoral dummies are included only in specification (1). Variable CGI_Industry is constructed on all firms 
in an industry excluding the given firm.  
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Fig. 5.3.5. The demand for corporate governance by industry. Average level of corporate 
governance in industry explains 54 per cent of variation in the sectoral dummies in the OLS 
regression for the demand for corporate governance (Table 5.3.4).  
 
The figure displays the relationship between average industry level of corporate governance and coefficients of sectoral 
dummies from regression (1) in Table 5.3.4. R2 = 0.54. 
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6 Conclusions 
Ten years after the beginning of privatization and corporatization, poor corporate governance still 
remains a serious problem in Russia.24 Ways of addressing this problem are far from obvious. The 
lack of an honest and competent judicial system renders formal implementation of institutions of 
corporate governance impossible, hence one has to rely on informal adoption of mechanisms of 
investor rights protection. In this context, it is only appropriate to agree with the Federal 
Commission, which, after developing the Code of Corporate Conduct, chose not to impose it on a 
compulsory basis but only recommended companies to adopt it. 
To assure voluntary adoption of informal institutions, management and controlling shareholders 
should have appropriate incentives. In Russia, this turns out possible only if they consolidate a 
sufficiently large stake. Our study shows that an increase in the ownership concentration has a 
positive impact on corporate governance. On the other hand, this effect proves to be nonlinear. 
Once management or a large outside owner consolidate too large a block of shares, a further 
increase of their stake lowers the quality of corporate governance. The mechanisms of corporate 
governance studied in this paper (and provided by the Code) protect the rights of small outside 
shareholders only when the managers or a large outside owner do not have a majority of votes. 
Hence, mechanisms are needed, which would make it possible to reduce transaction costs of 
“closing” public companies (converting public companies into closely held ones) in firms where 
ownership is ‘too concentrated’. This requires certain institutional changes, in particular, the 
development of the independent appraiser industry.  
How do ownership structure and corporate governance affect investment? Concentration of 
ownership increases the likelihood of investment: the higher the share of managers or large outside 
owners, the more they are interested in investment. The effect of corporate governance is not 
significant; however, the level of corporate governance and the stake controlled by small outside 
shareholders prove to be complementary in terms of their impact on investment.  In other words, 
corporate governance positively affects investment in companies, where the share of small 
shareholders is fairly high. Since there are very few such companies in our sample (as there are in 
Russian industry as a whole), the effect of corporate governance is, on average, not significant. 
The size of the company also plays an important role. Costs of introducing modern standards of 
corporate governance are relatively small for larger companies. It is not surprising then that the level 
of corporate governance is, other things being equal, higher in large companies. The same is true of 
investment.  
The mechanisms of corporate governance that the Code offers can have been introduced by the 
companies voluntarily even prior to the introduction of the Code. Our study shows that demand for 
the Code and its individual provisions and standards does depend positively on the current level of 
corporate governance in the company. Companies, which have already implemented specific rules 
and standards of the Code, find them more acceptable. We have also found the spillovers at the 
industry level: the more firms in the industry have implemented the norms of Code, the more likely 
other firms in the industry are interested in adopting the Code. 
The attitude to the Code also depends on managers’ awareness of its contents. This means that the 
Code mostly plays the educational role, and efforts to disseminate information about it should be 
encouraged. Presently, most Russian companies know next to nothing about the Code: only a third 
of respondents answered that they were aware of the Code and only 4% said that they knew its 
contents in detail.  
                                                 
24 Our survey shows that the average level of implementation of six norms of corporate governance (see Section 3.1) is 
42%, with all six norms being implemented by only 1.3% of companies.   
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8. Appendix 
8.1   Distribution of answers to the questions of the questionnaire 
Questionnaire 1. Corporate governance - status quo 
  
 As a percentage of those who answered this questionnaire * 
 yes no total 
Do you use INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (US GAAP/IAS)? 9 84 93 
Do you have A SHAREHOLDERS DEPARTMENT? 58 40 97 
Do you supply AGENDA of general shareholders meeting to all of your  
shareholders ? 
20 76 97 
Are there INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS on the board of directors of your company? 63 31 94 
Are there REPRESENTATIVES OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS on the board of 
directors? 74 15 90 
Is your shareholders’ register maintained by an INDEPENDENT REGISTRAR? 34 60 95 
*A total of 1033 companies answered this questionnaire  
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Questionnaire 2. Investment and ownership   
 
What were your investment finance sources in the past (2001) year? As a percentage of respondents who answered this question* 
there was no investment 24 
own funds  67 
bank loans 21 
new share issue 1 
other 6 
*A total of 962 companies answered this question 
 
 As a percentage of those who answered this questionnaire* 
 yes no total 
Do you have a reconstruction and development plan requiring considerable investment? 
 
67 31 98 
Do you have a large tax debt or overdue accounts payable? 48 50 97 
* A total of 992 companies answered the questions of this questionnaire 
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 As a percentage of those who answered his questionnaire * 
 more than enough  sufficient insufficient total 
How do you appraise investment in the past (2001) given 
EXPECTED DEMAND? 
 
1 19 66 86 
*a total of 992 companies answered the questions of this questionnaire 
 
 
 
At what HIGHEST interest rate are you prepared to take a LONG-TERM FOREIGN 
CURRENCY-DENOMINATED bank loan? 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question * 
not required  31 
5-10% 62 
11-20% 7 
More than 20% 1 
*A total of 836 companies answered this question  
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As a percentage of those who answered this 
questionnaire * 
What actual percentage of shares do you think is owned by:  
0 1-24 25 - 49 50-74 75-100 total 
the management  28 38 10 8 3 87 
the largest outside investor 38 20 13 13 4 88 
all small shareholders (each of whom owns no more than 5%) 31 23 15 6 5 80 
*A total of 681 companies answered the questions of this questionnaire 
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Questionnaire 3. The Corporate Conduct Code  
 
 
As a percentage of those who 
answered this questionnaire* 
Are you familiar with the Corporate Conduct Code drafted by the Federal Securities 
Commission? 
90 
      yes, in detail 4 
      yes, in general 29 
      no  57 
Does your company have any restrictions on share acquisition, ownership or voting for minority and foreign 
shareholders?  75 
yes 22 
no 53 
Do you think there is a need for such a code imposing standards of corporate governance based on best practices? 86 
yes 44 
no 4 
hard to appraise 38 
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Do you think adoption of corporate governance standards will help to attract investment in Russian industry? 86 
certainly so  5 
most probably yes 22 
hard to appraise 41 
most probably not 15 
certainly not 3 
Are you prepared to disclose information about degree of conformity of your corporate governance practices to 
recommendations of the Code?  i 
no 20 
yes, we are prepared to do that voluntarily after the Code has been published 33 
yes, all companies with more than 1,000 employees must do that 14 
*A total 886 companies answered the questions of this questionnaire  
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Which corporate governance problems do you think are currently the most sensitive in Russian 
industry? 
As a percentage of 
respondents who 
answered this question* 
weak protection of small shareholders 38 
insufficient control over managers’ operation 27 
failure by companies to meet information disclosure requirements 13 
inadequate competence of the members of the board of directors 24 
inadequate protection of creditor rights 18 
inadequacy of current legislation (laws on companies, on bankruptcies, etc.) 51 
weakness of the judicial system in settling corporate disputes 29 
other corporate governance problems 4 
main problems of Russian industry go beyond corporate governance  40 
*A total of 612 companies answered this question 
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As a percentage of those who answered this 
questionnaire* How do you appraise acceptability of adoption of the key rules and 
standards of the Code for your company (also, if you take into account 
the required “cash” costs) : acceptable  unacceptable hard to appraise  Total 
Allowing all shareholders full, equal and timely access to information 
about the company (specifically, in the course of a shareholders 
meeting.) 
49 8 28 85 
Disclosure of information to general public (in a prospectus, quarterly 
and annual reports) 28 23 33 84 
Control over insider information, no use of confidential information 
about the company for personal benefit. 24 7 52 84 
Election of independent directors to the board of directors. 27 22 35 84 
Safeguarding of small shareholder rights in the course of major deals, 
reorganizations (preemptive right, approval by general shareholder 
meeting) 
28 17 39 84 
Engagement of an independent appraiser in conducting major deals, 
reorganizations; independent audits. 48 7 29 84 
Imposition of clear rules for dividend distribution 49 5 30 84 
*A total of 886 companies answered the questions of this questionnaire 
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Questionnaire 4. Investment. 
   
What PREVENTS your company from attracting (an) OUTSIDE investor(s)? 
As a percentage of 
respondents who answered 
this question* 
1) not required 22 
2) there have been no attempts to do that  14 
3) lack of information about investors 17 
4) Company’s lack of experience 11 
5) complicated investment procedure  20 
6) non-transparence of financial information 7 
7) risk that pre-investment stage will bring no results  10 
8) demand that too large a stake be sold  13 
9) demand that the investor be given access to management  7 
10) demand that production structure be changed  4 
11) doubts that it is realistic to attract investment  20 
12) doubts about reliability of the investor 18 
13) indecision of the investor 
 17 
*A total of 590 companies answered this question  
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Are you satisfied with CAPITAL EXPENDITURES of your company in 2001? As a percentage of those who answered this question* 
yes 20 
no 80 
*A total of 854 companies answered this question 
 
What is the biggest OBSTACLE TO INVESTMENT in the current (2002) year? As a percentage of those who answered  this question* 
1) nothing 2 
2) lack of own funds  86 
3) high interest rates on loans 27 
4) difficulty of taking a long-term loan 22 
5) low return on investment 9 
6) high prices for investment goods and construction/installation 40 
7) excess capacity 7 
8) other 2 
*A total of 881 companies answered this question 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY 
NES-CEFIR-IET  WWW.CEFIR.RU  51 
 
What kind of INVESTMENTS did you make at your company in the past (2001) year? As a percentage of those who answered  this question* 
1) none 24 
2) to renovate worn out capacities 57 
3) to expand capacity with the same efficiency  9 
4) to install new capacities of higher efficiency 25 
5) to reduce labor costs 8 
6) to reduce energy and materials consumption 19 
7) to reduce hazardous emissions 9 
8) to improve safety standards 11 
9) other 4 
*A total of 891 companies answered this question 
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 8.2  The variables 
Manager Managerial stake 
Large outside Largest shareholder's stake 
Small The stake in the hands of all small (up to 5%) shareholders  
Logsales Logarithm of annual sales  
Liquidity Liquid assets at end of year / annual revenues 
Exports Share of exports in revenues  
Closely held 
company 
1, if closely held, 0 if public 
Profitability Gross profit/revenues 
CGI Corporate Governance Index, principal component based on six 
questions about current level of corporate governance at the 
company 
Demand Demand for the Code as a whole 
Demand7 Index of demand for specific provisions of the Code, the principal 
component based on 7 questions about acceptability of specific 
provisions of the Code 
Demand for 
credit 
Rate of interest (annual, hard currency at which the company is 
prepared to take a long-term loan).  
Categories: no need, 5-10%, 10-20%, >20% 
  
Industries  
11 Power and fuel  
12 Iron and steel, non-ferrous metals 
13 Chemicals and petrochemistry 
14 Machinery and metalworking 
15 Forestry, woodworking, pulp and paper 
16 Construction materials 
17 Light industry 
18 Food-processing 
19 Other 
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8.3   Tables 
Table P1. Structure of Goskomstat’s register and IET panel 
  
INDUSTRIES AND SUB-
INDUSTRIES 
NUMBER OF 
COMPANIES  
EMPLOYMENT,  
PERSONS 
SHARE OF 
EMPLOYMENT, 
% 
REPRESENTATION OF 
PANEL AS REGARDS 
EMPLOYMENT , 
  REGISTER PANEL REGISTER PANEL REGISTER PANEL % 
1 POWER   841 20 708310 114156 5.26 3.86 16.12
 FUEL        
2   OIL           110 11 308536 18304 2.29 0.62 5.93 
3   GAS            32 1 37754 1407 0.28 0.05 3.73 
4   COAL, SHALE, PEAT   352 31 456519 106950 3.39 3.62 23.43 
5 IRON AND STEEL 275 44 718041 226024 5.33 7.64 31.48 
6 NONFERROUS 417 34 523400 199502 3.89 6.75 38.12 
 CHEMICALS/PETROCHEM        
7   CHEMICALS              471 39 620781 117944 4.61 3.99 19.00 
8   PETROCHEMISTRY 163 22 224883 51183 1.67 1.73 22.76 
 MACHINERY        
9     POWER PLANT MACHINERY 42 10 95013 49570 0.71 1.68 52.17 
10     LIFTING-CONVEYING 78 20 64839 29818 0.48 1.01 45.99 
11     RAILROAD MACHINERY.   48 13 112939 50353 0.84 1.70 44.58 
12     ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 463 40 333890 50268 2.48 1.70 15.06 
13     OIL/CHEMICAL MACHINERY 214 34 185713 51652 1.38 1.75 27.81 
14     MACHINE TOOLS 301 24 154955 33869 1.15 1.15 21.86 
15     INSTRUMENT-MAKING  291 47 350349 111509 2.60 3.77 31.83 
16     AUTOMOTIVE   240 30 699055 271567 5.19 9.18 38.85 
17     TRACTORS/AGRI. MACHINES 241 28 302009 91314 2.24 3.09 30.24 
18     ROAD-BUILDING MACHINES 197 33 99771 35126 0.74 1.19 35.21 
19     LIGHT INDUSTRY, FOOD    268 6 119694 2703 0.89 0.09 2.26 
20     PLUMBING/HYGIEN EQUIP      102 6 54107 3840 0.40 0.13 7.10 
21     AIRCRAFT     89 22 442808 132973 3.29 4.50 30.03 
22     ARMAMENTS 131 33 600421 207084 4.46 7.00 34.49 
23     SHIPBUILDING     99 15 164217 31005 1.22 1.05 18.88 
24     RADIO 126 22 230844 44546 1.71 1.51 19.30 
25     COMMUNICATIONS EQUIP 117 21 157190 57645 1.17 1.95 36.67 
26     ELECTRONICAL 274 35 268239 84091 1.99 2.84 31.35 
27   OTHER MACHINERY 330 29 340439 101842 2.53 3.44 29.91 
28   METAL STRUCTURES 669 10 198168 7271 1.47 0.25 3.67 
29   MAINTENANCE-REPAIRS 1822 15 431690 7432 3.20 0.25 1.72 
 FORESTRY, WOODWORKING, PULP AND PAPER    
30   LOGGING 1463 49 433657 49833 3.22 1.69 11.49 
31     SAW MILLING    309 15 93149 18511 0.69 0.63 19.87 
32     WOOD COMPONENTS 367 30 124627 31670 0.93 1.07 25.41 
33     FURNITURE 639 55 194198 43312 1.44 1.46 22.30 
34   OTHER WOODWORKING 111 10 26594 7172 0.20 0.24 26.97 
35   PULP AND PAPER 187 20 170941 34866 1.27 1.18 20.40 
 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS    
36   CEMENT/ASBESTOS 73 20 57979 20838 0.43 0.70 35.94 
37   PREFABRIICATED CONCRETE 1013 14 276386 5252 2.05 0.18 1.90 
38   WALLING 643 20 151951 11058 1.13 0.37 7.28 
39   CONSTRUCTION CERAMICS 42 3 23898 2156 0.18 0.07 9.02 
40   NON-METALLIC MINERALS 288 8 56247 2729 0.42 0.09 4.85 
41 OTHER BUILDING INDUSTRY 349 14 104784 5421 0.78 0.18 5.17 
42 GLASS-FAIENCE  167 5 108808 12929 0.81 0.44 11.88 
 LIGHT        
43     COTTON FABRICS      190 44 207752 90750 1.54 3.07 43.68 
44     WOOL      105 27 87575 35619 0.65 1.20 40.67 
45     KNITTED FABRICS    314 28 107945 24391 0.80 0.82 22.60 
46   OTHER TEXTILES  404 38 127385 33971 0.95 1.15 26.67 
47   GARMENT            1425 65 335226 53375 2.49 1.80 15.92 
48   LEATHER/FOOTWEAR 538 23 184676 24270 1.37 0.82 13.14 
 FOOD PROCESSING         
49     SUGAR-MAKING         97 16 53930 9523 0.40 0.32 17.66 
50     BAKING 1504 19 234636 5339 1.74 0.18 2.28 
51     CONFECTIONERY  360 18 89216 14265 0.66 0.48 15.99 
52     ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 551 41 117306 20729 0.87 0.70 17.67 
53   SPICES, SEASONING 670 9 146500 5749 1.09 0.19 3.92 
54     MEAT           702 24 186698 16454 1.39 0.56 8.81 
55     DAIRY 1492 53 188423 20797 1.40 0.70 11.04 
56   FISHERY      391 2 167382 879 1.24 0.03 0.53 
57 MICROBIOLOGICAL 40 0 23832 0 0.18 0.00 0.00 
58 MILLING-CEREALS 494 19 97392 8693 0.72 0.29 8.93 
59 MEDICAL         152 3 104514 2081 0.78 0.07 1.99 
60 PRINTING      422 4 77510 1132 0.58 0.04 1.46 
61 OTHER            484 2 106306 1358 0.79 0.05 1.28 
 TOTAL 24789 1428 13471997 2957363 100 100 21.95
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Table P2. Capital investment by source of finance, % of capital investment. Source: 
Goskomstat 
 All industries  Manufacturing 
Fixed investment - finance sources 1998 1999 2000 1999 
    Own funds 53.2 52.4 46.1 72.0 
    Outside sourses 46.8 47.6 53.9 28.0 
        Of which, budgetary funds 19.1 17.0 21.2 4.7 
 
Table P3. Factors explaining availability of a reconstruction and development plan 
 (1) (2) 
CGI 0.056* 0.026 
Manager -0.063 -0.121 
Large outside 0.222+ 0.287* 
Small -0.260** -0.255* 
Log sales 0.044* 0.066* 
ind12 0.138 0.169 
ind13 0.067 0.103 
ind14 -0.013 0.079 
ind15 0.035 0.077 
ind16 0.180 0.194 
ind17 0.089 0.186 
ind18 0.166 0.179 
ind19 0.238  
Liquidity  1.591+ 
Number of 
observations  
323 231 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 
+ significant at the 10% level; * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is 0 if 
the company did not have a reconstruction and development plan requiring considerable investment, is 1 if there was 
such a plan  
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Table P4. Investment and investment finance sources. Multinomial logit. Base category – 
no investment 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Only inside 
investment 
Outside 
investment 
Log sales 1.023** 0.963** 
Liquidity 18.564* 3.031 
Reconstruction plan 0.062 0.975+ 
Manager 1.974* 0.912 
Large outside 1.010 1.370 
Small 1.691* 0.486 
CGI -0.214 -0.143 
Exports 0.361 0.482 
ind12 -17.525** -19.110** 
ind13 -18.131** -19.127** 
ind14 -16.538** -18.312** 
ind15 -15.315** -16.957** 
ind16 -16.856** -18.237** 
ind17 -17.654** -18.418** 
ind18 -15.660** -17.323** 
ind19 -16.711 15.650 
Moscow -0.060 -32.350 
Far East -0.774 -0.212 
North West -0.546 -1.371 
Siberia -1.634+ -0.855 
South -0.762 -2.337+ 
Urals 0.205 1.011 
Volga -0.311 0.640 
Constant 4.613 5.672 
Number of 
observations 
208 208 
Pseudo R2 0.23 
+ significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level.  
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Table P5. Correlation Matrix 
 
 CGI Mgmt LOutside Small LogSales  Liquid. Profit 
CGI  1.00       
Mgmt  -0.05 1.00      
LOutside  0.23* -0.27* 1.00     
Small  0.17* -0.12* -0.08 1.00    
LogSales  0.41* -0.12* 0.14* -0.03 1.00   
Liquidity  -0.11* 0.10* -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 1.00  
Profit  -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13* 0.02 1.00 
Export  -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
CloselyHeld -0.06 0.20* -0.12* 0.17* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Invest 0.12* 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.34* 0.09* -0.02 
External -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 
Credit Demand 0.08* 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.13* 0.07 
RenovPlan  0.10* -0.03 0.08* -0.13* 0.20* 0.03 -0.06 
Demand  0.18* -0.06 0.03 0.10* 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 
Demand7  0.23* -0.10* 0.07 0.11* 0.13* 0.01 0.06 
NoAnswerC -0.25* 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12* -0.02 -0.06 
NoAnswer7 -0.21* 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.08* 
              Export Closely
Held 
Invest External RenovPlan Demand Demand7 
Export  1.00       
CloselyHeld 0.01 1.00      
Invest 0.05 0.02 1.00     
External -0.08* -0.03  1.00    
Credit Demand -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.11*  1.00   
RenovPlan  0.03 0.01 0.19*   0.08*   0.25*  1.00    
Demand  0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.12*  1.00 
Demand7  0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.09* 0.03 0.06 0.45* 
NoAnswerC 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.22* 
NoAnswer7 0.07* 0.02 -0.02 -0.08  -0.11* -0.01 -0.36* 
 Demand7  NoAnswerC  NoAnswer7  
Demand7  1.00   
NoAnswerC -0.13* 1.00  
NoAnswer7 -0.46*  0.19* 1.00 
* - correlation is significant at 5% level 
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8.4 Brief description of the Code of Corporate Conduct  
The code gives the following definition of corporate conduct: 
“Corporate Conduct is the concept covering various activities concerned with governance of businesses. Corporate 
governance affects performance of businesses and their ability to raise capital required for economic growth. Improvement 
of corporate conduct in the Russian Federation is a key measure required for increasing investment inflow to all sectors 
of the Russian economy, from domestic sources and foreign investors alike. Implementation of certain standards based 
on the analysis of best practices of corporate conduct may become one of the ways of such improvement.  
The purpose of application of corporate conduct standards is protection of interests of all shareholders, regardless of the 
size of shareholdings owned by them. The higher level of protection of shareholder interests can be achieved, the larger 
investment Russian joint stock companies (hereinafter referred to as companies) can rely on, which will have a positive 
impact on the Russian economy as a whole.  
The Code establishes the following principles of corporate governance: 
1. Corporate conduct practices should effectively enable shareholders to exercise their rights associated with 
participation in a company.  
2. Corporate conduct practices should secure equal treatment of shareholders owning equal numbers of shares of 
the same type (category). Equal protection should be secured for all shareholders if their rights are infringed. 
3. Corporate conduct practices should secure strategic management of company operations by the board of 
directors and efficient control by the board of directors over activities of executive bodies of a company, as well 
as accountability of the members of the board of directors of a company to shareholders thereof. 
4. Corporate conduct practices should enable executive bodies of a company to exercise efficient management of 
company operations in a reasonable manner, in good faith and solely in the interests of a company, and 
should secure accountability of executive bodies of the company to the board of directors of a company and 
shareholders thereof.  
5. Corporate conduct practices should secure timely disclosure of full and accurate information about the 
company, including its financial position, performance, ownership and management structures in order to 
enable shareholders and investors of a company to take reasonable decisions. 
6. Corporate conduct practices should take into account statutory rights of parties concerned, including company 
employees, and encourage active cooperation between the company and the parties for the purpose of increasing 
the net worth of the company, the value of its shares and other securities, and of creating jobs. 
7. Corporate conduct practices should secure efficient control over business and financial operations of a company 
for the purpose of protecting rights and lawful interests of shareholders. 
In addition, the code provides detailed recommendations on the following issues: 
A general meeting of shareholders: calling and preparation of a meeting, agenda, procedures for conducting a 
meeting, voting procedures 
A board of directors: its responsibilities, formation, members, independent directors, organization of board of 
directors’ activities, remuneration of directors.  
Executive bodies of the company (management board, general director), authority and responsibilities, 
members, formation, organization of activities, remuneration, answerability. 
Major deals, reorganizations: definition, procedures. 
Disclosure of information about a company: goals, forms, provision of information to shareholders, auditing, 
an auditing committee. 
Dividends: setting the amount, distribution procedures 
Settlement of corporate disputes. 
